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(17977)

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

MOROCCO

PART 2

January to December 1948

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING MOROCCO

PART 2.—JANUARY TO DECEMBER 1948

Z 169/48/28

No. 1

TANGIER BUDGET, 1948

Schemes for Social Development, &c.

Consul-General Mallet to Mr. Bevin. (*Received 8th January*, 1948)

(No. 155) *Tangier*,
Sir, *31st December*, 1947

The Committee of Control, at its last session of the year, approved the ordinary budget for the Zone of Tangier for 1948, which had been voted by the Legislative Assembly on 17th December.

2. The ordinary budget for 1948 shows expenditure estimated at 561 million francs (about £550,000) against receipts estimated at 583 million (£570,000). The total expenditure for the year is likely to amount to about 800 million francs, of which some 52 per cent. will be for salaries of officials, including police. The exact total will not be known until the extraordinary budget is voted in January. In 1947, the budget balanced around 500 million, but, in actual fact, the receipts for the year will amount to about 900 million. The unprecedented surplus of at least 350 million is chiefly accounted for by the customs receipts, which will have totalled some 700 million or more than double the estimate. Imports into the Zone are actually running at the rate of nearly 5,000 million a year (over £4½ million): exports will total about 700 million. In spite—or rather because—of this 85 per cent. deficit in the balance of trade, the Tangier Administration is more prosperous than it has ever been before. It has already in reserve over 510,000 kilog. of gold, 85,000 dollars, 50,000 Swiss francs, 2,300,000 pesetas and 71 million Moroccan francs. It has also put aside a sum sufficient to pay off next year the 2,675,000 Dutch guilder Port Loan.

3. The Administration proposes to use some of its surplus further to reduce consumption taxes, to increase the salaries of its civil servants, to improve its roads and drainage system, to provide better and more compact accommodation for its offices, to renew its equipment. It is considering schemes for encouraging education and other social services, for laying out a new native town and for considerably enlarging the port. In all these schemes the Administration moves with a deliberation which is not solely due to the knowledge that the present prosperity may not last for ever. All present indications are that foreign money will continue to come to Tangier and that more and more banks and import–export businesses will be established, whose activities and profits will continue for some time to swell the revenue of the Zone. It is therefore to be hoped that the Administration will, before long, put some of their reserves to good use in the service of the native population, whose share in the present boom is of the slightest and who are seriously affected by the continuous rise in prices which accompanies it.

I have, &c.
W. I. MALLET.

Z 392/392/28 No. 2

TANGIER: ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1947

Consul-General Mallet to Mr. Bevin. (*Received* 17*th January*)

(No. 5) *Tangier,*
Sir, 8*th January*, 1948.

I have the honour to transmit herewith my report on events in Tangier during the year 1947.

I have, &c.
W. I. MALLET.

Enclosure in No. 2

Report on Events in Tangier during 1947

Introduction

Tangier continued, during 1947, to offer a haven of economic and financial liberty—some would call it licence—of personal freedom, and of plenty, in marked contrast with conditions in neighbouring countries. The gloomy prognostications that the exceptionally favourable conditions would disappear, were not fulfilled, and there is little prospect of their being fulfilled so long as the present controls exist on the movements of funds and goods in other countries, or until drastic action is taken by the Spanish Government to check the influx of pesetas by which the life of Tangier is so largely financed. Thus, although producing very little itself and with imports amounting to 4,800,000,000 fr. (about £4½ million) against exports worth 575,000,000 fr. Tangier has succeeded in increasing the budget surplus from 273 million fr. in 1946, to about 400 million fr., although expenditure has increased from 550 million fr. to about 800 million francs.

2. While due credit should be given to the Director of Finance for his management of the finances of the zone, the real reason for this state of affairs is to be found in the ability of the Tangier merchant and financier to use the advantages offered by the zone to attract capital to Tangier and to pass its imports on to neighbouring countries. The profits derived from these operations have, no doubt, in some measure been shared by the whole population, but, while large fortunes have been made by the few, the many complain bitterly of the steady rise in prices which is due partly to the fact that practically everything that Tangier consumes has to be imported. On the positive side, the Administration has done little on which the Powers responsible for Tangier can pride themselves. The year has, in fact, revealed more clearly than ever before the weaknesses of the present Administration and the faults of the Statute which condemned the zone, for political reasons, to an administrative machine which is not only too big for the zone, but is too often run in the interests of certain Powers, rather than of the zone itself.

3. The Legislative Assembly, which is the only permanent organ of the zone that can claim to represent Tangier opinion, has tended to become more and more critical of the Administration and of the Mixed Court, while showing no more readiness to help the former when any question arose which might involve a reduction in the profits made by the traders and bankers.

4. The Mixed Court itself was the object of the frankest criticism by the press and the Assembly and it was only after a year's wrangle that the latter could be persuaded by the Committee of Control to vote a modest increase to bring the salaries of the judges above that of the chief of police, whose duty is to execute their decisions. Tangier opinion, outside the court, is unanimous that a radical reform of the court, such as was agreed to be necessary so long ago as 1928, would be essential before an inhabitant of the zone could count on being able to get justice done to him. Such a reform, and indeed almost any other, it is, however, impossible to achieve without the agreement of the Powers, and this agreement will not be forthcoming short of a new international conference, at which the respective claims of the various Powers can be weighed and fought out against each other.

Position of the Powers

5. The French have continued to maintain the hold which they were clever and quick enough to establish in 1945. Through the Mendoub, they exercise control over the administration of the natives. With their Assistant Administrator, their control of the Customs, of the health services, of the public works of the zone and of the port, with their strong influence in the police and with the votes which they command in the Assembly, the French are in a position to do very much as they like in many spheres of Tangier life. The French authorities at Rabat miss no opportunity of emphasising the contention that Tangier forms part of the dominions of the Sultan, whom they protect, or of building up the position of France economically and culturally in Tangier.

6. The Spaniards have begun to raise their heads after the blow which their prestige suffered in 1945. Maintaining always that the only real solution for the Tangier question is the incorporation of the zone in the Spanish Zone, of which it forms an enclave, they yet seem prepared to agree to the continuation of the international régime, provided that it is made really international, or provided, at least, that the chief posts in the Administration are shared out among the four Powers chiefly concerned, viz., Spain, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. So long as the French predominate, the Spaniards tend to concentrate on building up and reorganising their commercial and cultural interests here so that, when the next Tangier conference meets, they will be able to show how strong are their interests in Tangier. Thus, in spite of the fact that the drain of the peseta into Tangier is causing them serious preoccupation, the Spanish authorities themselves continue to invest large sums in the building of new schools, hospitals and banks. Towards the end of the year, the Spaniards seemed to be trying to use the shortcomings of the Administration as an attempt to show how much better things were when they administered the zone.

7. The United Kingdom maintained her strategic interest in the independence and neutrality of Tangier. She maintained the size and influence of her community and the value of her investments, but her proportion in the import trade has fallen and the number of British ships visiting Tangier has still far to go to approach the pre-war figure. Certain new commercial enterprises have been planned, but the only ones realised during the year were the opening of an air line connecting Tangier with Gibraltar, and of a small branch of a firm which hires out aeroplanes on charter. The main strength of the British position is derived from the fact that neither France nor Spain wishes the other to be predominant here.

8. The interests of the United States are mainly commercial. Imports from the United States amounted to about 40 per cent. of the total imports of the zone in 1947. The two big wireless stations operated by the R.C.A. and Mackay continued both to relay messages and to receive and transmit local messages, in spite of considerable opposition from Rabat (see "Wireless" below). From the strategic standpoint, the views of the United States seem to coincide with our own, though the United States appear to lay rather more emphasis on the possible value of Tangier as a bridge-head in the event of another war. In general, the United States Legation continues jealously to preserve the capitulatory rights which their nationals and their local protégés enjoy in Morocco and their refusal to apply to them any local laws which appear to the State Department to restrict their freedom of commerce, makes the work of administering the zone still more difficult.

9. Russia has shown no interest in Tangier during the year and has taken no steps towards exercising the rights of representation here that were granted to her in 1945.

10. Italy has been chiefly concerned to begin her come-back to Tangier by resuming her place in the Committee of Control. This was made dependent, first, on her signature of the Peace Treaty and then on its ratification. When the latter took place, the French made strenuous efforts to defer Italy's re-entry into the Committee of Control until 1948, or otherwise to prevent the Italian representative succeeding his British colleague as President of the Committee of Control. The failure of the Soviet Government to notify, by the end of the year, their consent to Italy's re-entry automatically meant that the Netherlands' representative, who was next in the alphabetical order, became president in January 1948.

11. The activities of the Belgian and Portuguese representatives on the Committee of Control were largely concerned with the various members of the Administration who are of Belgian and Portuguese nationality.

Sultan's Visit

12. It had become known in the autumn of 1946 that the Sultan wished to pay a visit to Tangier—a town which no Sultan had visited since 1889. The French appear to have been undecided whether the value of such a visit to their prestige would be outweighed by the risks of the Nationalist demonstrations to which it might give rise. After a good deal of discussion the visit

was postponed until the spring in order that the Committee of Control and the Administration might have more time to settle the various problems which the visit would create. The first of these was that of providing food and shelter for the visitors expected to come to Tangier for the occasion, the numbers of whom were estimated at anything from 5,000 to 50,000. The second was that of security. There was considerable anxiety lest the religious and nationalist feeling bound to be engendered by such an occasion should lead, if not to outbreaks of lawlessness, at least to state of tension and excitement, such as might spontaneously develop into trouble. The international police force of some 200 men, unsupported as it is by gendarmerie or troops, was thought to be inadequate to guarantee peace and order in the town and throughout the zone, and also to ensure the safety of the Sultan. The French therefore proposed that His Majesty should be accompanied by some 500 of his negro guard. The Spaniards objected on the ground that the entry of a military force was contrary to the statute. When the French Consul-General argued that the guard was a purely ceremonial body, his Spanish colleague suggested that, in that case, a contingent of the Khalifian guard should also be sent from the Spanish Zone to serve the Sultan. The French, however, refused to allow the entry of any body which might be under Spanish officers, and it looked as if it would be necessary for one of the other Powers to send a warship which could land a party to form the reserve without which the chief of police refused to accept responsibility for maintaining order. None of the Powers was enthusiastic about sending a force which might have to restore order among the natives, and for a time matters seemed to have reached a deadlock. The French Consul-General then had the happy idea that, as the Administrator was a Portuguese admiral, it would be a gracious act if the Portuguese Government would send a warship, nominally to salute the Sultan, but actually to land a party in case of need. The Portuguese Government appeared to be flattered at the invitation and actually sent three ships, not a man from which had, in the event, to be landed even to patrol the streets. The Spaniards having made their protest and reserved their position in regard to the statute, withdrew their opposition to the entry of the Black Guard. The controls established at the French and Spanish frontiers restricted the number of visitors from the other zones to modest proportions. Tangier justified the opinion expressed by the commander of the Sultan's guard as being too lethargic and comfortable to become inflammable, and the visit passed off in perfect good order. A number of tiresome little questions of protocol gave the Committee of Control full exercise of their ingenuity in finding compromises. For example, the Italian representative made strenuous efforts to be treated on an equal footing with the rest of the Committee of Control, and the American diplomatic agent insisted on having precedence over all members of the Committee of Control, although now himself a member of that body. This episode showed how difficult it is to work the Administration smoothly so long as the United States Government refuses to recognise the statute, although belonging to the committee which supervises its operation.

Moroccan Nationalism

13. If, however, the gloomier prognostications were not fulfilled and the visit, which lasted from 9th to 13th April, was a complete success from the point of view of the Tangerines, who made public holiday, and of the Sultan, who was received everywhere with enthusiasm, the French got a severe shock. Away from the atmosphere of Rabat, the Sultan, in a series of carefully prepared speeches, delivered by himself to the Diplomatic Corps, the notables and the press, or by his son and his daughter, used the freedom of the town, which he described as the diplomatic capital of his empire, to place himself definitely at the head of the nationalist movement. He openly championed the programme of the independence and unity of Morocco, and although he was careful to emphasise the need for peaceful development, he tore up the speech approved by the Residency and, after emphasising the community of interest between Morocco and the Arab States, addressed an appeal to the Powers represented in Tangier to help Morocco to attain the principles of liberty and self-government to which they professed devotion.

14. So seriously did the French Government take this that, on the Resident-General's return to Rabat from the official luncheon given by the Sultan in Tangier, he was recalled to Paris and relieved of his post in favour of General Juin, who came to Morocco with the clear policy of taking a very much firmer line with the Sultan.

15. On the day after the Sultan's departure, the leaders of the nationalists and of the influential Derkawi sect organised a demonstration in sympathy with the Moors who had been killed in a riot in Casablanca on 7th April. Although quite peaceable, this demonstration showed that the existing police force was inadequate to prevent illegal demonstrations without having recourse to arms, and the Administration was able to persuade the Assembly considerably to increase the mounted and mobile sections of the force.

16. The lead given by the Sultan was, of course, welcomed by the nationalists in Tangier, the most important group among which consisted of Mekki Nasiri's Moroccan Unity Party. His newspaper *La Voix du Maroc*, which had long been attacking the French, went to such lengths that the French representative was able to persuade the Committee of Control to agree to its suspension for six months on the grounds of infraction of the article in the statute which forbids agitation and propaganda against the established order in the neighbouring zones. Shortly afterwards, the Spanish Consul-General demanded and secured the suspension of another nationalist paper, *Mourrakouch*, on similar grounds. The latter paper is likely to resume publication early in the new year.

17. These events, and particularly, no doubt, the firm line taken by General Juin in the Protectorate had the effect of greatly reducing nationalist activities in Tangier during the rest of the year. It it believed, moreover, that as part of their policy of encouraging elements jealous of or hostile to the Sultan or the nationalists, the French were able to work on the venal, if influential, Sherif Derkawa to such effect that his relations with Mekki Nasiri deteriorated noticeably.

18. In accordance with the policy adopted by His Majesty's Government as a result of a meeting held in London in January, on the subject of nationalism in French North Africa, the attitude adopted by His Majesty's Consulate-General towards the nationalists was one of reserve, contacts being limited to those necessary to enable His Majesty's Consul-General to carry out his functions as a member of the Committee of Control. During the first half of the year there were suggestions that the United States Legation was either deliberately or unwittingly giving some encouragement to nationalist elements, and this caused the French some concern. During the latter part of the year, whether because the nationalists were lying quiet or because of a wiser attitude on the part of the new American Minister, there were few signs of the legation encouraging the nationalists and, generally, relations between the French and the Americans improved.

Communism

19. There are two Communist parties in Tangier, the P.C.E. (Partido Comunista Español) and the P.C.M. (Partie Communiste Marocaine), but there is no liaison between them. The P.C.E. has, however, recently made an attempt to unite all Left-wing parties under the title "Frente Democratico Tangerino." A meeting was held at the end of November by the P.C.E., at which representatives from the C.N.T. (Confederación Nacional de Trabajo), the Partido Socialista, the Partido Sindicalista and the Joven Socialista were present, but these parties, although frequently accused of having a Communist flavour, are not true Communists.

20. The P.C.E. comprises about seventy-five members and consists of about twelve cells. They never meet as a whole. Their activities are confined to sticking up posters, distributing newspapers and propaganda and collecting funds. During recent months tickets have been sold in order to raise 200,000 pesetas to help the resistance in Spain. The Tangier branch takes instructions from Casablanca and close liaison is maintained between the P.C.E. and the Communist groups in Gibraltar. The party accepts no new members from Spain until they have been carefully vetted, and even consults the Socialist Party regarding ex-members of this party who wish to join the Communist Party. Party members read and distribute the newspaper *El Mundo Obrero*, which is published in Casablanca. José Balongo is shortly taking up the position of secretary and intends to reform the party, possibly under the name "Partido Socialista Sovietico Iberico." The junior section of the P.C.E. is known as "La Joventud Socialista Unificada" (J.S.U.) and comprises about ninety members divided into "clubs." They distribute a paper called *Joventud*. The female section of the party is represented by an organisation called "Mujeres Antifascistas." This is at present insolvent owing to the delinquencies of the late secretary.

21. There has been an increase in the activities of the P.C.M. in Tangier in the last few months, where they have distributed a great deal of propaganda. Most of this has been written in Arabic and attacks the British and Americans. It is inspired by the Communists in the French Zone. On the other hand, the chairman of the executive committee of the Tangier branch has stated decisively that the party should remain clandestine and not attempt to recruit any new members.

Communist Liaison with Nationalists

22. Attempts at liaison with the nationalists have been made by the P.C.M., but there is no proof that the nationalists have shown themselves willing to co-operate. Ali Yata, the secretary of the P.C.M. in French Morocco, visited the Sherif Derkawa at the end of September and stated that the policy of the P.C.M. was to give all possible assistance in the fight for the independence of Morocco. He invited the Derkawa to collaborate with the Communist Party and asked him to pass on similar invitations to nationalists in the Spanish Zone. He added that the P.C.M. was prepared to furnish arms for the use of the Moors and that in conjunction with certain leaders of the Istiqlal Party, a supply of arms was being organised through Tangier.

23. It must, one would have thought, be a little disconcerting for the nationalists, who have been trying hard to woo American opinion, to find their would-be allies so fiercely attacking the Americans for their "imperialism."

Wireless Questions

24. The French have long been anxious to prevent Tangier becoming the seat of a number of uncontrolled broadcasting stations. His Majesty's Government are, in principle, in agreement, but negotiations for the control of broadcasting in Tangier, which had been begun between the two Governments before the war, had never been completed. The increase in the number of stations here, the entry into the field of local telegraph traffic of the two American stations originally set up as relay stations, and, in particular, a report that the State Department were going to transfer from Algiers to Tangier a large propaganda broadcasting station, re-awoke French anxiety to impose a measure of control. With this object, the French attempted to revive a claim which they had put forward before the war, for a monopoly for all broadcasting in the zone for a French controlled company which operated a station called Radio-Tanger. In support of this claim, they appealed to various articles of the Act of Algeciras and of the statute and to a judgment which the Mixed Court gave in 1939, declaring unconstitutional a law which had been passed by the Assembly prohibiting broadcasting and which, in effect, gave a monopoly to Radio-Tanger, which was the only company operating here when the law was passed.

25. Both His Majesty's Government and the French Government were agreed that the first step towards the control of broadcasting here was the application to the zone of the Radio Convention and of the General Radio Communications Regulations. In June, the French Consul-General received instructions to get this done at once. The French Consul-General apparently hoped by this means to forestall the establishment of the proposed State Department broadcasting station and therefore tried to get the Committee of Control to vote a law applying the Madrid and Cairo Agreements. This the committee were able to escape by pointing out that, as all Powers signatory of the Act of Algeciras had ratified the agreements, they automatically applied in the zone, and that only a notification to this effect was required. The French then asked the Committee of Control to close down two other stations known as Radio-International and Radio-Africa, on the ground that their operations were now illegal because neither of them had obtained the licence foreseen in the Madrid Convention. The committee took the line that no station could be closed down for not having a licence until a local law or regulation had been issued stating how such a licence was to be obtained. At the same time, the Resident-General instructed the Acting Administrator to oblige the two existing American stations operated by R.C.A. and Mackay, to cease from accepting local telegraph traffic, on the ground that, in dealing with such traffic, they were infringing the Shereefian telegraph monopoly. This request was quite properly rejected on the ground that the International Administration did not accept orders from Rabat. It was, in any case, a foolish demand to make so long as the United States Government maintain that their capitulatory rights enable them to refuse to apply any local law to American nationals. These rights the Americans are resolute to defend and they are determined

to get on an equal footing as regards broadcasting before being willing even to discuss the control of radio operations in Tangier. Their co-operation is, therefore, essential if this control is to be achieved.

26. It was clearly useless to discuss this question locally, except after agreement between the three Powers chiefly concerned. Unfortunately, the French showed no signs by the end of the year of being willing to abandon their pretensions to a monopoly, and the scene of discussions therefore moved to Washington in the hope of effecting an Anglo-American agreement which could then be presented to the French.

Contraband

27. The fact that Tangier is able to exist economically is due to the large quantities of pesetas and francs which enter the zone clandestinely. With these currencies are financed the large imports which swell the revenues of the Administration and of which a large proportion finds its way, also clandestinely, to neighbouring countries. Contraband trade is therefore the life-blood of the zone. A good deal of it is carried in small vessels, of which several fly the British flag. Aggravating though it is to see the British flag used to cover such a trade, it is the import into other countries, rather than the export from Tangier which is illegal. This does not mean that there are no illegal exports from Tangier, or no illegal imports; unfortunately, neither the port authorities nor the police have always both the wish and the power to prevent smuggling. His Majesty's Consul-General was constantly trying to stimulate the police into greater energy, especially when there were many rumours of Tangier becoming a centre for the traffic in arms. With one small exception, no concrete evidence of any such traffic was forthcoming until the autumn, when the police were not unnaturally delighted to be able to announce the discovery of a plot to sell a number of hand grenades which had been smuggled out of the Italian consulate. There was some feeling locally that this discovery came too conveniently after the French had failed to secure the postponement of Italy's return to the Committee of Control for it to be pure coincidence, and a careful investigation of the incident left a suspicion that the affair might have been a put-up job. However, the majority of the members of the Committee of Control were agreed on trying to prevent the incident having political consequences and in the result, no blame was attached to the Italian Consul-General beyond, perhaps, that of having placed too much confidence in the employee who had charge of the arms.

28. M. Caruso endeavoured to get the court to agree that his employee was covered by extra-territorial rights which he claimed that his consulate and staff enjoy under the treaties in force here. The court were at first disposed to demur, but in their final decision tried to avoid the issue by finding the consular employee not guilty, on the ground that the crime of trafficking in arms had occurred outside the consulate.

Social Measure for the Natives

29. In January, the Committee of Control suggested to the Administrator that something more ought to be done for the natives by way of providing education. It was felt that the International Administration could not simply shelter behind the phrase in the statute which entrusted the "administration" of the native population to the Mendoub, in order to wash its hands of the well-being of the Moorish population. In reply, the Assistant Administrator submitted in May a plan of social reform which was warmly welcomed by the committee, who urged that specially urgent attention should be given to preparing schemes not only for education, but also for relieving the natives from usury, for improving agriculture, for building a new prison and, in particular, for housing the native population. Since the statute came into force, the native population in the zone has more than doubled, but industries to employ the Moors are almost totally lacking and their housing conditions are squalid and disgraceful. While £4 million worth of modern flats is now under construction for Europeans, nothing is being spent on the Moors. In spite of constant prodding by the Committee of Control, the only law which had been submitted to and passed by the Assembly by the end of the year to realise these reforms was the voting of a sum of money to build a new prison.

Inefficiency of the Administration

30. But it was for their lack of foresight and efficiency in regard to the public services that the Administration was most generally criticised. It was only in the autumn that the contract was given for doubling the water pipe line, although for two years water had been rationed in the Zone. It was in the autumn, too, that a complete breakdown in the supply of electricity led the Assembly to insist that

the Administrator should require the concessionary company to give good reason why its concession should not be cancelled for failure to fulfil its terms. The telephone and omnibus concessionary companies were also severely criticised. The Port Company had failed to award a contract for the work of extending the jetty for which money had been voted in the spring. Eventually they proposed to award the contract to a French firm without public adjudication, on the ground that other companies could not supply the necessary plant. The Committee of Control was obliged to remind the Administrator of the need for granting tenders only after adjudication in which firms, even in distant countries, would be able to compete. But the Administration was most blamed for its incompetence in regard to public works. Of 290 million francs voted by the Assembly in 1946 and 1947, only 20 million had been spent by September 1947. One of the chief reasons was that neither the French nor the Spanish members of the Administration, nor their respective Consulates, were prepared to let important contracts go to the firms of the other country. The Administration was also blamed by the Assembly for giving them insufficient time to study a proposal made for renewing the concession of the Régie for the tobacco monopoly. The result will probably be that the Régie's monopoly will be renewed provisionally for one year only.

31. These failings on the part of the Administration were discussed in the Committee of Control in December, when the President expressed the opinion that the Administration had shown signs of negligence and dilatoryness, that there was lack of cohesion and of loyalty to the International Régime, and that these faults were not likely to be cured until the 74 year old Administrator had been replaced by a younger man of real drive. In discussing this matter afterwards with the President, the Portuguese Consul-General made it clear that, in his personal opinion at least, there could be no question of replacing the present Administrator, unless it were agreed in advance that the new man should also be Portuguese.

32. During the year, the complicated and legal nature of some of the issues with which the Committee of Control and the Administration had to deal, and the lack of precision in certain laws, made clear the desirability of appointing a Legal Adviser to the International Administration. The French, who had a candidate in Tangier, were very keen on the proposal until it was realised that the post was likely to be so influential as to make it essential that it should not be held either by a Frenchman or a Spaniard. The Netherlands Government were persuaded by His Majesty's Government to put forward a candidate and it is to be hoped that he will prove the best.

Native Affairs

33. The Mendoub, who is very old, has been ill and incapacitated during most of the year. His son and First Khalifa, Sir Mohammed Tazi, acted for him unofficially until officially appointed to do so by the Sultan. In November, the Sultan, in fact, went so far, in a letter written by his Grand Vizir, to issue instructions that the Khalifa was to preside over the Legislative Assembly. The French Consul-General admitted that the object of this move was to build up the Khalifa as his father's successor, but the proposal came to nothing because the Assembly showed no desire to modify its rules in order to allow the Khalifa to preside in the place of the Mendoub and the President of the Committee of Control questioned the Sultan's right to issue orders regarding the working of the Legislative Assembly.

34. A similar example of the neglect by the French authorities of the institutions of the Zone occurred when the French papers suddenly announced that the Sultan had approved a system for the election—indirectly enough it is true—of the Moorish delegates in the Assembly. In the Autumn of 1946, the Committee of Control had indicated that this was a matter which interested them and were therefore surprised to be presented with a *fait accompli* by the French, especially as the new arrangements seemed to certain members of the Committee to conflict with both the Statute and the Paris Agreement.

35. In October, the acting Mendoub issued an order restricting the movements of Moorish women in Tangier, forbidding them to attend cinemas, &c. Although criticised in some circles as a reactionary measure likely to retard the development of Moorish education and, therefore, the readiness of the Moors for self-government, it must be admitted that the measure seems to have found more approval than disapproval in Moslem circles in Tangier. This fact suggests that even those Moors who profess the more liberal ideas are hesitant about applying them when they affect their own family concerns.

Aviation

36. Early in the year, Air France, who own the Tangier airfield, obtained from the French Government credits to enable them to extend the runway and generally to modernise the landing ground. These works would involve the acquisition of a piece of adjoining land and certain lively spirits here suggested—and with reason—that it would be better if the Tangier airport were controlled by the International Administration. They therefore proposed to requisition this piece of land in the hope that Air France would then agree to their terms. Air France, however, made it clear that if the Administration prevented them from building a new runway, there would be no new runway at all. However desirable in principle that the Zone should possess its own airfield, it was clearly important that insistence on this principle should not lead to Tangier being without an airfield. Good sense eventually prevailed and by the end of the year 900 metres of new runway had been opened. It is hoped to double the length of the strip and put up new buildings during 1948.

37. An air service operated four times a day in each direction between Tangier and Gibraltar was opened in August by Gibraltar Airways, a company owned jointly by British European Airways and the Gibraltar shipping Company of Bland's. The services were well patronised and very regular in their operation, and the company hope to get permission to operate into the French Zone and Spain. The French authorities are, however, chary of authorising regular services which will compete with their own lines, though they made no difficulty about agreeing that Chartair, Ltd., should operate an air taxi service to the French Zone (as well as to Spain) by aircraft based on Tangier.

Naval Visits

38. Tangier enjoyed many visits from foreign naval vessels in 1947. Starting with an official visit by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranian, in H.M.S. *Liverpool* in February, the series continued with three Portuguese destroyers in April, H.M.S. *Triumph* in May, a succession of destroyers from Gibraltar conveying leave parties and a stream of units of the United States navy, including the cruisers *Houston* and *Fresnoy*. The series terminated with an official visit by the French battleship *Richelieu* in December.

Z 426/73/69

No. 3

SITUATION IN FRENCH MOROCCO

Sir O. Harvey to Mr. Attlee. (*Received* 19*th January*)

(No. 36) *Paris,*
Sir, 15*th January*, 1948.

With reference to my telegram No. 26 of 14th January I have the honour to report that in the press of 9th January a report appeared to the effect that the Sultan of Morocco had addressed a letter to the President of the Republic in which he was alleged to have complained of the conflicts which had arisen between himself and the Resident-General, asking for the latter's recall and insisting on the abrogation of the Protectorate Treaty. This report was written up in a somewhat sensational manner in the following days and much was made of the fact that General Juin, who was due to visit Paris for consultation, was supposed to have postponed his journey.

2. M. Bonneau, head of the Africa–Levant Department, was good enough to give the following account of the matter to His Majesty's Minister on 14th January. It appears that a letter was in fact addressed by the Sultan to M. Vincent Auriol on 3rd December last, but it related strictly to administrative action taken by General Juin. It did not ask for General Juin's recall nor did it call for immediate independence and the abrogation of the Protectorate Treaty. On the contrary, in his letter, His Majesty alleged that it was General Juin who had been acting contrary to the treaty.

3. The background of this difference of opinion is that the various reforms which the French are introducing in Morocco have been considerably retarded by the reluctance of Sultan to sign the necessary decrees which will make them effective. The Sultan's reluctance is no doubt due to the

fact that it is precisely these reforms which justify and strengthen the French administration of Morocco. In the French view the Sultan and the Istiqlal Party are not at all eager for reforms at the present time and the cry for immediate independence (which they well know to be impossible) is a way of staving them off and obviating the need for making up their minds on the subject.

4. The particular reforms over which the differences, referred to in the Sultan's letter, arose were those which replace the present system of administering justice through the Kaids and Pashas by a system based on French practice. The new system does not replace the existing Koranic law, though no doubt in due course this will need to be properly codified as in other Moslem countries.

5. The reply which was, as I reported in my telegram under reference, in soothing but general terms was sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, since the President of the Republic only communicates direct with the heads of sovereign States. The correspondence is regarded by the French as being strictly of an internal character and it need not have been given any publicity whatever had it not been for the indiscretion of one of the Arab Nationalists in the National Assembly who was anxious, in the face of recent reports of Abd el Krim's activities in Cairo in favour of Moroccan independence, to establish the fact that the Sultan was by no means inactive himself (as you know Abd el Krim also lays claim to the Sultan's title " Commander of the Faithful ").

6. The press reports on this subject were indeed followed by an announcement by Abd el Krim in Cairo of the formation of a " Committee for the Liberation of North-West Africa," composed of the representatives of the Nationalist Parties of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The policy of this committee is said to be to refuse negotiations with France before the recognition of the independence of the three territories in principle. Each Nationalist Party retains its liberty to negotiate with France independently of the others. Abd el Krim is reported to have declared that he would be prepared to safeguard French interests and property in Morocco if independence was granted. In this he is said to be opposed to his fellow-Nationalist Allal el Fassi, whose attitude is more resolutely intransigent and anti-French. Abd el Krim's more moderate demands are said to be partly due to the disappointment of the Nationalists at the United Nations decision over Palestine. There seems, however, to be some closing of the Nationalist ranks, since Habib Bourguiba has joined the Cairo Committee on behalf of the Tunisian Destour party, while there are rumours of renewed contacts between the Algerian Nationalists Ferhat Abbas and Messali Hadj, who have hitherto been divided by differences in policy.

7. It is the opinion of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that in fact Abd el Krim's influence on the course of events in Morocco is very small. They are on the whole satisfied with the situation and General Juin's arrival in Paris on 14th January is for the purposes of a normal exchange of views.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo and His Majesty's consular officers in Rabat, Tunis and Algiers.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

ASHLEY CLARKE.

Z 1244/425/69 No. 4

NATIONALIST ACTIVITY IN MOROCCO

Consul-General Mallet to Mr. Bevin. (Received 13th February)

(No. 24) *Tangier,*

Sir, *7th February,* 1948.

In my despatch No. 13 of 17th January, 1948, I reported that my French colleague was showing signs of nervousness at the recrudescence of Nationalist activity here, and indeed it appears from the comings and goings reported in my despatch No. 25 of 7th February that the Nationalist leaders will try more and more to make Tangier the centre for their activities. The various experts on Moroccan affairs in the French Consulate, the Administration and the Mendoubia were all expressing anxiety lest the coincidence of these Nationalist activities with the feast of the local saint, Bou Arrakia, at the end of the religious festival of the Mouloud might lead to trouble.

2. The feast-day of Bou Arrakia is always the occasion for large processions to the tomb of the saint, where the pious make offerings and where the descendants of the holy one now live. The Mendoub learned that certain of the more modern spirits among the Moors proposed to use the occasion this year to make a counter-demonstration and to seek to divert some of the contributions from the saint's tomb to the new school founded opposite this consulate-general by the Sultan last spring. The motives behind this proposal were several. Firstly, there was the dislike of Maraboutism and of the worship of saints on the part of the more modern minds and of the Nationalists, who pin their faith to the Sultan. Secondly, there was a desire on the part of the Nationalists to help with the building of the new school, for which, I am told, subscriptions are not coming in very fast, and, no doubt, to make some Nationalist propaganda.

3. The Mendoub, who is responsible for the administration of the native population and for ensuring respect for the traditional Moslem festivals, felt that trouble was to be expected and called on the Administration—as he is entitled to do under the Organic Dahir—to ensure that neither the public peace nor the traditional ceremonies connected with the feast of Bou Arrakia were disturbed. The police accordingly barred the roads leading from the Grand Socco towards the new school and made it clear that only those processions would be allowed that followed the traditional route to the saint's tomb. This led to some mild disorder, in the course of which a portrait of the Sultan was slashed by a policeman's sword and some leaders of the crowd were arrested. On the following day, orders were circulated by the Nationalist groups that Moorish shops should be closed as a protest against these events and a number of dockers were called out on strike. A delegation claiming to represent the different groups of the population of Tangier called on the president of the Committee of Control and on me and left a letter in which they protested against the attitude of the police and asked for the punishment of the policeman who slashed the Sultan's portrait and for the release of the arrested men.

4. The incident was of small intrinsic importance, but it shows the currents running in Tangier and reveals the difficulties in the way of working the International Administration. In spite of the fact that the responsibility for the decisions that were taken rests with the Mendoub, the blame for them will be attributed by the natives to the French. Nor, I fear, will they be wrong, for the French attitude towards the Nationalists here is well known as is their desire to support the heterodox Maraboutism against the orthodoxy for which the Sultan stands. It is certainly the French influence in the Mendoubia, the Administration and the police that we have to thank for the suppression of what might be regarded as a harmless, if not praiseworthy, desire on the part of the more modern Moors to help on the construction of the new school.

5. The French view, as expressed by M. de Beauverger and by the Assistant Administrator for Native Affairs, is that the Moors in question were out to make a demonstration. They could, M. Girardière told me, perfectly well have sent the present of bricks and mortar, which formed part of their procession, to the school on any other occasion, and could even have held their procession on the feast-day if they had sought previous permission in accordance with the law on public manifestations. That they did not choose to do so was due to the fact that, as they feel that this is their country, they were unwilling to seek the necessary permission to hold a procession. In the view of the French, it is essential to enforce the law. Once the Moors got to know that it could be flouted, there would be no holding them. There was already a certain unrest amongst them and inflammatory speeches such as Torres was making might lead to trouble. This may well be true, though my information is that the wiser Moors, at least, realise that talk of driving the French out by force is nonsense, and that the policy of gradual evolution advocated by Ouassani is wiser Moreover, I cannot help an uneasy feeling that the policy of rigorously applying the law on every occasion instead of allowing the steam to escape may equally well lead to future trouble. The other conclusion to be drawn is that so long as the Mendoub has the duty of administering the native population, and so long as the Mendoub is controlled by the French, the native population will not get much right of free expression. It will be something, however, if the Committee of Control and the Administration can use the refusal to grant any political freedom to the Moors as a weapon for pressing for the earlier adoption of those measures of social reform to which I referred in my despatch No. 68 of

20th June last. It is, therefore, satisfactory to know that the Administration's proposals for improving the housing conditions of the natives, for establishing a land credit fund and an agricultural provident society, and for fixing minimum wages are now at last being examined by the assembly.

6. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Consuls-General at Rabat and Tetuan and to his Excellency, the Governor of Gibraltar.

I have, &c.

W. I. MALLET.

Z 5446/226/28 No. 5

ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ZONE OF TANGIER

Consul-General Mallet to Mr. Bevin. (*Received 5th July*)

(No. 83) *Tangier,*
Sir, 28*th June*, 1948.

In my telegram No. 68 of 17th June I had the honour to report the unanimous nomination by the Committee of Control on 17th June of the Dutch candidate, M. van Vredenburgh, as successor to Admiral Magalhaes de Correa as Administrator of the International Zone.

2. At the opening of the meeting the Spanish Consul-General announced that his Government had decided to confer their highest naval decoration, the Grand Cross of Naval Merit, on Admiral Magalhaes. The Portuguese Consul-General stated that in view of the outstanding qualities of the Dutch candidate, they had decided to put forward no Portuguese candidate. The effect of this decision and of M. van Vredenburgh's election would be that Portugal would be the only Power with positive interests here which was not represented on the Administration. Moreover, Portugal would continue to have only one delegate in the International Assembly and no judge in the Mixed Tribunal. These facts would show that the Paris Agreement of 1945 had failed to solve fairly the problems of the government of the zone. The Portuguese Government wished to make it clear that they felt that they should have their due share in the Administration, the Assembly and the Tribunal.

3. On instructions, the Spanish representative then made a long statement, of which I enclose a copy,(1) on the views of his Government on the Paris Agreement of 1945. The main points of this statement were :—

(1) That when invited to accede to the Paris Agreement, in the negotiation of which they had not been asked to take part, the Spanish Government had felt obliged to make reservations—as the United States Government had made in respect of their earlier treaty rights with Morocco—in regard to a settlement which they felt to be unjust to their rights in Tangier based on the treaties of 1923 and 1928 and on the Franco-Spanish Exchange of Notes of 1935.

(2) That articles 1 and 2 of the Anglo-French Agreement and the first resolution of the Final Act showed that the régime created in 1945 was a provisional one of which the duration should not exceed six months. If the negotiators had meant something by the agreement which was not written in it, the Spanish Government could hardly be expected to have cognisance of it. Both because they were represented on the Committee of Control and in the light of article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, which provided that a State even not a member of the United Nations might bring before that body differences with other States, the Spanish Government felt that they had a right to express their interpretation of the 1945 Agreement and to ask other Powers represented here to give serious thought to it.

(3) That no action had been taken to implement article 2 and resolution No. 1 of the agreement, which foresaw that the Committee of Control should take steps to prepare a new statute, and that the Committee of Control had not made use of article 8 to effect desirable amendments in the agreement.

(4) That although resolution No. 7 (2) had laid on the signatory Powers the duty of providing, if necessary, help in provisioning the zone, it had been and still was Spain which supplied Tangier on a generous scale without asking any return in the way of foreign exchange.

(5) That although the Paris Agreement had suppressed the post of Assistant Adviser for Judicial Affairs, the need for an official of this sort had become so obvious that it had been necessary to appoint a legal adviser.

(6) That although the Mendoub had died in February, no successor had been appointed.

(7) That the Committee of Control had ignored the procedure for deputations laid down in article 7 (*e*) and that certain of its members had arrogated to themselves the right to expel persons from the zone without even consulting the committee as a whole.

4. Before proceeding now to choose a new Administrator under article 7 (*c*) of the Paris Agreement, the Committee of Control should, in the view of the Spanish Government, consider (*a*) the provisions of that agreement which showed that the provisional régime had been meant to last for only six months, (*b*) the infractions of the agreement perpetrated by the Committee of Control, and (*c*) the evident intention of the negotiators to provide for the possibility of modifying the agreement. It would be more appropriate, in their view, to modify the Paris Agreement in such a way as to enable each Power represented in Tangier to present a candidate. To limit the choice to the so-called neutral countries, whose interest in the appointment seemed slight, and especially to limit the choice to a single candidate, as had actually happened, hardly corresponded with the agreement of 1945 or with the legitimate claims of a country like Spain which had been placed in a position of clear disproportion to her interests in and services to Tangier.

5. Having made this declaration the Spanish Consul-General proposed that the minor Powers be again asked whether they did not wish to put forward candidates for the post of Administrator so that there might be at least the possibility of some choice. He made it clear that he had nothing against the Dutch candidate, and when his proposal was voted down in the committee, M. del Castillo said that he had no intention of voting against M. van Vredenburgh, who was therefore unanimously chosen.

6. The local Spanish newspapers have since contained inspired messages to the effect that the Spanish representative drew the attention of the Committee of Control to the injustice caused by the indefinite prolongation of the actual situation in Tangier and to the legitimacy of the Spanish claims, as well as to the need for reforming the statute in harmony with the various interests existing in Tangier. It was stated that, in view of the precarious nature of the provisional régime, the election of a new Administrator was inadvisable. The newspaper *Africa* wrote that Señor del Castillo, while refraining from demanding the recognition of the Spanish preponderance in Tangier, exposed the senselessness, from the Spanish point of view, of the present state of affairs. The Paris conference, the paper continued, was concerned less with the interests of Tangier, Morocco or even of the Powers, than with giving satisfaction to Russia, and it was incredible that Spain should now suffer from the sanctions imposed on her for that purpose in 1945, and it was high time that she should cease to be deprived of the place in the Administration to which her position in Tangier entitled her.

7. It is a little disturbing that the Spanish Government should have considered it necessary to start this campaign in spite of the fact that M. del Castillo made a similar statement about the validity of the 1945 Agreement so recently as 10th March. Their motives are probably, first, to show that they have not changed the views they have already recorded about the unfairness to Spain of the 1945 Agreement and to make it clear that in their view the appointment of a new Administrator does not mean acquiescence in the indefinite renewal of the agreement. Secondly, perhaps, they desire that, if the provisional régime has to go on for the present, modifications should be made in it such as will restore to them some of the ground they lost here in 1945. In their campaign to start discussions here such as may lead to some modifications, Spain is likely to have the support of both Italy and Portugal. She is making a good deal of play locally with the idea of Lusitanian solidarity.

8. There is substance in the charge that the 1945 Agreement was obviously intended to be replaced by a new statute for which

(1) Not printed.

a conference would be called within six months. This intention has in fact been contradicted by the declaration at the end of the Final Act that no new conference would be held with the present Spanish Government. So long as this remains the position it would, in my view, be a mistake either to ask the Spanish Government to define more clearly their desires, as my Dutch colleague has proposed, or to initiate any discussions with the object of modifying the 1945 Agreement. The agreement, or the statute, stands as a whole: there is nothing in it which can be modified to the satisfaction of the dissatisfied Powers which would not involve seeing what settlement can be reached on other points, and to my mind it would merely uselessly awaken the Spanish and Italian appetites if the Committee of Control were to begin discussing amendments of the statute when there is no prospect of a conference being held to confirm them. My French colleague suggested that it might be desirable to express surprise in Madrid at this *démarche* which seems likely to disturb the peaceful working of the present régime and is hardly consistent with the hopes which the Spanish Consul-General held out of a period of quiet if the Spanish candidate were chosen for the post of legal adviser. I, myself, feel that it might be better to answer locally such of M. del Castillo's points as can be most easily answered, such as Nos. (4) to (7) in paragraph 3 above, and, as regards what appears to be the main object of his *démarche*, namely, to get discussions started here for the modification of the provisional régime, to state that no useful purpose would be served by such discussions so long as there is no prospect of a new conference.

9. There is, of course, a possibility that if the other Powers continue to ignore Spain's desire for a modification of the existing agreement, the Spanish Government may be tempted to put pressure on the other Powers by cutting off supplies from Tangier or by making the appeal to the United Nations Organisation at which M. del Castillo hints. The majority of my colleagues are not inclined to take these suggestions too seriously. Spain could, no doubt, cut off supplies of petrol, olive oil and electric current from Tangier, but it seems doubtful whether she would in fact take such drastic action at a time when her own international position is somewhat uncertain and when it might react on her relations with the Moors.

10. I shall be glad to receive your instructions in due course.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid and to His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon.

I have, &c.
W. I. MALLET.

Z 4444/226/28 No. 6

SPANISH GOVERNMENT CLAIMS TO SECURE CONTROL OVER THE INTERNATIONAL POLICE IN TANGIER

Consul-General Mallet to Western Department. (*Received 5th July*)

Tangier,
Dear Department, *28th June*, 1948.

In paragraph 7 of my despath No. 83 of 28th June I referred to the desire of the Spanish Government to secure modifications in the provisional régime here. Although Castillo did not mention the police in the statement enclosed in that despatch, it is in the police that the Spaniards most desire to see a change. It may therefore be of interest to you to know the historical background of the Spanish claim to control over the international police.

2. In 1906 the Act of Algeciras ruled that the police in the ports of Morocco should be put under French and Spanish instructors and that in Tangier as at Casablanca the instructors should be both French and Spanish.

3. In 1913–14 the draft Statute of Tangier entrusted the command of the military police to a Spanish officer and that of the civil police to a French commissaire. It was agreed that until Spain should be in effective occupation of her zone the existing mixed Franco-Spanish Tabors should continue to exist.

4. In 1923 the statute laid down that the gendarmerie should be under the command of a Belgian officer. This provision was never actually applied and the existing Tabors under mixed Franco-Spanish command remained.

5. In 1925 Spain protested repeatedly against the inability of the International Administration to stop the contraband of arms and of aid to the Rifis. The powers decided not to modify the existing Tabors but doubled their strength. The Spanish Government continued to attack the Administration as constituting a threat to the security of the Spanish Zone and demanded the incorporation of Tangier in that zone. After Spain was defeated in an attempt to bring this question before the League of Nations, the Spanish members threatened the withdrawal of Spanish officials from the Administration: conversations followed with the French Government and in 1928 it was agreed between France and Spain that more effective measures should be taken to repress contraband in arms and subversive political movements, and that Spain should be given command over a reformed gendarmerie.

6. At the 1928 conference a Spanish officer was placed in charge of the reorganised gendarmerie with a French officer as his deputy. The convention of 1928 also created a Mixed Intelligence Bureau under a Spanish officer, who was given the title of Inspector-General of Security, with a French assistant and a Spanish subaltern officer.

7. In 1945 the Paris Agreement annulled the articles of the statute regarding the gendarmerie, suppressed the Mixed Intelligence Bureau and the post of Inspector-General of Security and laid down that the command of the gendarmerie should go to officers selected from persons either of Belgian, Dutch, Portuguese or Spanish nationality, with a French officer as Deputy Commandant. The agreement laid down that the authorities of the French and Spanish Zones should have the right to appoint liaison officers to the police administration for the purpose of dealing with police questions concerning their respective zones. The Spaniards claim that the liaison officer system is not working and that, as a result of the influence which the French have got over the police through their Deputy Commandant, no facilities such as were promised in the treaty are afforded to the Spanish liaison officer.

Yours ever,
W. I. MALLET.

Z 5713/3856/69 No. 7

TRADE UNION ORGANISATION IN FRENCH MOROCCO

Consul Wall (*communicated*)

Casablanca, 2nd July, 1948.

I am afraid I have taken some time to reply to your letter No. 41/37/19 of 7th June, about Communists in the trade unions. The difficulty is to get hold of reliable information about persons who are professionally of a somewhat retiring disposition.

The following is a general outline of trade union organisation in this zone :—

Separate "Syndicats" exist for each of the principal industries or trades. *E.g.*, the miners have their "Fédération du Sous-Sol"; a "Syndicat" in some trades may be separated into "patrons" and "ouvriers," *e.g.*, the Barbers' Syndicat. Each such Syndicat is managed by an elected bureau.

The Syndicats are grouped in unions according to political principles. I am not yet quite clear whether each Syndicat enters *en bloc* into the union or whether the individual has some choice; but I should think the latter is unlikely. I am doing some further research on this.

I. The biggest of the Unions of Syndicats is the "Union Générale des Syndicats confédérés du Maroc," which forms part of the Confédération Générale du Travail" (C.G.T.), and is controlled by Communists and Communist sympathisers.

Under the U.G.S.C.M. comes the "Union Locale des Syndicats de Casablanca," which groups the Syndicats of the local industries. In practice its activities do not seem to be clearly separated from those of the U.G.S.C.M.

II. The "Union Gén·rale des Syndicats 'Force Ouvrière' du Maroc." In politics this is anti-Communist; its membership and influence do not appear to be large, but it is said, by anti-Communists, to be growing.

III. "Union Marocaine des Syndicats Chrétiens." A small, entirely French

organisation, opposed to the U.G.S.C.M. It is difficult to assess its influence, but it is probably not very great.

I enclose a list(1), obtained from the Casablanca Région, of officials of these three unions as they were in 1947.

2. The members of the Communist Party whose names most frequently appear in print do not figure as trade union officials. The U.G.S.C.M. is consistently supported by the Communist newspaper, *Espoir*, which, together with the *Petit Marocain*, has protested, for instance, against the arrests of union members after the riots of Oujda and Djerada and against the discharge of Allal Bachir, treasurer of the Miners' Syndicat, and Taieb, general secretary of the Miners' Syndicat. Allal, it may be observed, has now been expelled from the French Zone. Similiarly, *Espoir* and *Le Petit Marocain* link the police raid on the Casablanca headquarters of the Communist Party on 21st June with the general attack on trade union liberties which, they allege, the protectorate authorities are planning.

3. It seems to be a grievance that while trade unions have, of course, *de facto* recognition in French Morocco and the authorities are reported as having announced that a Dahir according legal recognition of "le droit syndical" is ready and about to be issued, it has not in fact yet been issued, and there is no doubt that the Government is doing little to accelerate it. A frequent cause of complaint by the unions is that Government officials hinder the free participation of native Moroccans in union activity.

4. It is doubtful whether either of the Nationalist Parties supports the U.G.S.C.M. strongly: the Islamic force in Moroccan nationalism is naturally opposed to communism (which, in Nationalist eyes, is now pro-Zionist, since a good many of the educated Jews here are sympathetic to communism) while, of course, communism condemns the *bourgeois* nationalism of the Sultan and the landlords. Nevertheless, great care is taken by the Communist Party and the U.G.S.C.M. to have native Moroccans, or at least Muslims, in prominent positions. Thus, one of the two general secretaries of the U.G.S.C.M. is a Moroccan Muslim—Mohammed Tahar.

5. The Spanish Workers' Union—"Union General de Trabajadores de España en Marruecos"—and the "Union des Femmes du Maroc" are both Communist-controlled organisations. Sporadically they pass resolutions condemning reactionary activities, but they appear to do little else.

6. Local officials say (whatever they may think) that the Communist movement here is by no means so serious a matter as the Nationalist movement. They point to the small attendance at rallies and meetings called by the Communist Party and claim that its membership is trifling. However, I do not suppose that these officials are unaware that it is general Communist practice to keep the nucleus of active party members small, or that they are blind to the fact that there are large numbers of urban unemployed here as well as poor peasants who would rally to the party if conditions favoured and policy required an appeal to them.

7. I hope later to be able to add to this rather scrappy summary, but the gathering of information about personalities is a slow business.

(1) Not printed.

Z 5446/226/28 No. 8

SPANISH DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF TANGIER

Views of His Majesty's Government

Mr. Bevin to Consul-General Mallet (Tangier)

(No. 76) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *20th August*, 1948.

In your despatch No. 13 of 28th June you drew my attention to certain remarks made by the Spanish Consul-General at the meeting of the Committee of Control when M. van Vredenburgh was unanimously elected the new Administrator of the Tangier Zone. The burden of these remarks was to express the dissatisfaction of the Spanish Government with the manner in which the international régime in Tangier, as re-established by the Anglo-French Agreement of 31st August, 1945, was operated to the prejudice of Spanisn interests.

2. I agree with your view that so long as there is no prospect of a conference of the Algeciras Powers being held to conclude a new convention, it would be a mistake either to ask the Spanish Government to define more clearly their desiderata or to initiate any discussions with a view to modifying the 1945 agreement. I also agree that there is little real danger of the Spanish Government putting pressure on the other Tangier Powers by cutting off supplies or by making an appeal to the United Nations in the face of continued refusal to consider their desire for a modification of the present agreement.

3. In general it appears to me that the statement of the Spanish Consul-General was intended primarily to record once more the Spanish Government's view about the unfairness of the 1945 agreement, and in these circumstances I am inclined to doubt the wisdom of making any reply, even locally. If, however, you feel strongly that some reply should be made, and that this can be done without raising Spanish hopes that by continuing to express their dissatisfaction they can gradually manœuvre us into discussing the whole question of a new convention, you have authority to do so in the manner you suggest. You may also, if you think fit, take a suitable opportunity of informing your Spanish colleague that coming so soon after the appointment of a Spanish candidate to the post of legal adviser, his statement has caused a most unfortunate impression.

4. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Lisbon and Madrid.

I am, &c.
(For the Secretary of State),
GEORGE CLUTTON.

Z 10391/91/28 No. 9

FRANCO-SPANISH ZONAL RELATIONS

Consul-General Hope Gill to Mr. Bevin. (Received 6th December)

(No. 63) *Tetuan,*
Sir, *1st December*, 1948.

I have the honour to report that, rather surprisingly, in view of the complete Spanish control and censorship, the local Arabic press, which now consists of the intermittent *Dastur*, daily *Nahar* and occasional *Shehab* and *Rif*, have devoted very considerable space to the anniversary of His Majesty the Sultan's accession, to which they give much more prominence than they recently did to that of the Khalifa. There are various long-winded articles by different authors affirming the loyalty of the Moroccan people to His Majesty and stressing their affection for him. In addition, there are elaborate congratulations, and evocations of the accession, and even of those of former Sultans. All the papers follow a somewhat similar pattern. In addition, they quote the Throne speech in full. All papers also give prominence to His Majesty's counsel to his children: that they are not to consider themselves different from, or superior to, and of the other inhabitants of Morocco.

2. My French colleague is, nevertheless, most despondent over Franco-Spanish zonal relations. While a little progress and co-operation are evident in the Mouluya, where jointly-planned barrage and irrigation works are at length under way, and while a bridge is now to be begun in the spring to link the dead ends of the Sheshawen–Lucas and Wazan–Lucas roads with the long-needed bridge, M. Lemaire tells me that he can make no impression whatever on the Spanish Administration in other matters of mutual concern and accommodation, as, for instance, the vexed question of the stoppage of the vegetables and other supplies from the French Zone to Tangier, across the Spanish Zone. He spoke bitterly of the possibility of having to organise a "Berlin air lift" into Tangier.

3. The French Consul-General is still unable, as ever, even to see the Spanish High Commissioner and gives it as his opinion that, whatever the façade of mutual esteem rigged between Generals Juin and Varela, the latter is showing so little practical regard for the former's wishes as to belie it and even endanger it.

4. It seems as if the close co-operation of the spring of this year has disintegrated, probably because there is now felt to be no common enemy, namely, the Nationalists,

worth combining against any longer, illusory though the feeling may be.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid and His Majesty's Consuls-General at Tangier and Rabat.

I have, &c.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

Z 9900/9900/28 No. 10

TANGIER: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, 1948

Consul-General Mallet to Mr. Bevin. (*Received 6th December*)

(No. 137) *Tangier,*
Sir, *2nd December*, 1948.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my annual report on the heads of missions at Tangier for July 1948, and to express my regret that, owing to an oversight, this report was not submitted sooner.

I have, &c.
W. I. MALLET.

Enclosure in No. 10

Heads of Foreign Missions at Tangier, 1948

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports)

Belgium

M. de Radiguès de Chennevière (arrived 19th February, 1945), consul-general with the personal rank of minister.

*M. de Radiguès was counsellor in Paris at the outbreak of war and subsequently passed some time in a concentration camp. He is industrious and painstaking and enjoys preparing memoranda for the Committee of Control. As he is also able he is a very useful colleague. He has a pleasant if slightly malicious sense of humour. Both he and his wife, by whom he has three children, are socially minded and most friendly and pleasant colleagues. They both speak good English. M. de Radiguès has other grown-up children in Belgium by his first wife. (Written in 1947.)

France

M. Edmond de Beauverger (arrived 5th March, 1945), consul-general with the personal rank of minister.

*M. de Beauverger is an officer *de carrière* of the French diplomatic service, who was at the Quai d'Orsay for the period preceding the war and on the collapse of France was appointed "chef du protocole" to the Vichy Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It was not, however, many months before he saw the light and resigned, in consequence of which he found re-employment at Algiers under the Provisional French Government. (Written in 1946.)

M. de Beauverger takes his work very seriously and appears to be rather frightened of the Residency-General at Rabat. He certainly does nothing without their instructions, and when he professes to have been kept in the dark by Rabat he does not always carry conviction. It is probably impossible for the French representative in Tangier to be an absolutely frank colleague, but I feel that M. de Beauverger goes as far in this direction as can be hoped for. He speaks good English and is quick and intelligent and very friendly, and we like him and his wife very much. Mme. de Beauverger is unfortunately a martyr to arthritis. They have two daughters in their early 20's and a son of 19.

Italy

M. Corrado Baldoni (arrived 12th October, 1948), consul-general with the personal rank of minister.

M. Caruso left Tangier in August to take up a post in the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and was replaced by M. Baldoni who had been "chef de personnel." M. Baldoni gives the impression of being more intelligent and less excitable than his predecessor and is likely to be an abler and more distinguished representative of his country. Mme. Baldoni's father was, I understand, a high official at the Italian court. She speaks some English.

Netherlands

M. Paul Staal (arrived 23rd January, 1946), consul-general.

*M. Staal is a retired member of the Netherlands consular service and spent almost his entire career in the Far East, India and Australia. During the war he and his wife suffered considerable hardships in Holland under German occupation. His two topics of conversation are the achievements of the British in India and his experiences in Holland during the war. On both he is rather a bore. (Written in 1947.)

He is sensible and friendly but rather lazy, and although serving this year as president of the Committee of Control, he has been absent for several months. Mme. Staal died here in the spring.

Portugal

M. José Luiz Archer (arrived 11th October, 1947), consul-general with the personal rank of minister.

M. da Cunha having been recalled to a post of Under-Secretary in Lisbon, he was replaced by M. Archer who had previously served in Vigo, Rio de Janeiro, and latterly in Lisbon. M. Archer is quick and energetic and has made an efficient president of the Committee of Control in the absences of the Dutch Consul-General. He is extremely pleased with himself and, though personally friendly, does not disguise his distrust of parliamentary governments and of democratic régimes. He speaks fair English. Mme. Archer is a pleasant if rather dull and lazy creature. They have two married children (though he must be under 50) and a younger girl here.

Spain

Señor Don Cristóbal del Castillo (arrived 10th September, 1945), consul-general with the personal rank of minister.

Señor del Castillo joined the Spanish diplomatic service in 1917. He was minister-counsellor in Paris before the war and minister in Athens before serving here as consul-general from 1942–44 when he was appointed assistant under-secretary in Madrid. After the Paris Conference in 1945 he was reappointed consul-general in Tangier. During the war he gave the impression of being anti-British, but on his return evidently felt it desirable to disguise these feelings and he frequently spoke to me of the need for co-operation between Spain and the United Kingdom and the United States. He appeared to feel acutely the difficulty of his position as representative of a country which had been forced to relinquish her illegal occupation of Tangier, but still considered herself to have the strongest claims to predominance here. He, therefore, kept to himself as much as possible and tried to prevent repercussions in Tangier of Spanish political problems and, apart from making long statements whenever he felt it necessary to place Spanish claims on record, he seemed anxious to avoid causing serious difficulties on the Committee of Control. During the last few months, however, M. del Castillo's attitude has changed for the worse and he has become extremely active in pressing for the restoration of Spain's former position in the International Administration. He evidently has considerable pull in Madrid and has worked hard to encourage the build-up of Spain's position here. He gives the impression of wishing to go down to history as the man who gave Spain a pre-eminent position in Tangier. The somewhat totalitarian methods which he now tends to employ make him an uncomfortable colleague on the Committee of Control. There is no doubt that he is able and cunning as well as ambitious. His wife, who is a charming little lady from Bilbao, speaks English. They have one son.

United States

Mr. Edwin A. Plitt (arrived 22nd August, 1947), diplomatic agent and consul-general.

Mr. Plitt was born in 1891. He began life as an engineer and after the Great War joined the foreign service, being posted to Sofia, Constantinople, Athens and Paris, where he was in 1939. When relations were broken off with Germany Mr. Plitt returned to Washington and later became Chief of the War Problems Division in the State Department. In 1945 he was appointed counsellor in Berne. Mr. Plitt is a friendly, pleasant little man and although rather conceited he is an excellent colleague. He is also much more tactful with the French than his predecessor and relations between the American Legation and the French officials are much improved in spite of continuing French suspicion of American ambitions in Morocco. Mr. Plitt is rather serious minded and appears to be a sincere believer in Anglo-American co-operation and in democratic traditions. His wife, who is French, is very young-looking for her age and also very friendly. They have one boy of about 20.

Z9901/9901/28

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN TANGIER, 1948

Consul-General Mallet to Mr. Bevin. (*Received 6th December*)

(No. 138) *Tangier,*
Sir, *3rd December,* 1948.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my annual report on leading personalities at Tangier for the year 1948.

I have, &c.
W. I. MALLET.

Enclosure

Report on the Leading Personalities in the Tangier Zone of Morocco

EUROPEANS

1. Apostoli, Giovanni
Italian judge, appointed in succession to Fernando Malmusi, when the latter was revoked on account of his Fascist tendencies in 1945. Apostoli is not a brilliant jurist nor an outstanding personality, but he appears to enjoys a fair reputation for honesty locally.

2. Artous, Louis
French second-in-command of the International Police and virtually in control of it. Was in the resistance movement in France during the war and was imprisoned at Buchenwald. An agreeable and shrewd personality, who effectively presses French interests.

3. Bastianelli, Auguste
Director of French Public Instruction in Tangier. The institutions he controls cover some 5,000 pupils. Politically he took the line of least resistance through the war. He is an able administrator, but is not well liked by his staff.

4. Betanzos, Reverend Father Antonio
Spaniard, born 1863. Franciscan. Bishop of the Diocese of Gallipoli, which includes the Spanish Zone of Morocco (except Ceuta and Melilla), and Apostolic Vicar of Tangier. Known to have Monarchist sympathies. Has great influence with the authorities, but does not systematically use it in political matters. He has interceded in favour of Republican Spaniards in trouble under the present régime. Probably instigated by Italian Franciscans, he persuaded the Spanish authorities to reverse their decision to close an Italian Republican Fascist school established soon after the armistice with Italy. He has a very intelligent and able secretary, Padre López (born 1893).

5. Cracco, François
Assistant Administrator of Finance. He is the Belgian nominee for that important post, and has acquitted himself with great efficiency and energy. He is a man of too high calibre for the job, and tends to get impatient with the businessmen of Tangier and with the members of the Legislative Assembly in their opposition to any sort of Government interference and control. Many of his ideas are sound but he tries to go too fast. Both M. Cracco and his wife are good socially, and speaking good English, mix freely with the British community.

6. Crambes, Dr.
French Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly, and president of the Anciens Combattants. He is generally regarded as being friendly in his attitude towards us.

7. De los Campos, Villarejo
Spaniard, born about 1900. Procureur of the Mixed Court, a post which he combines with similar functions in Tetuan. Rarely visits Tangier. Has British wife of Gibraltar origin and is believed to be not unfriendly.

8. Ellis, Lieut.-Colonel W. F., C.M.G., O.B.E.
British Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly. Retiring from the R.A.M.C., Colonel Ellis originally came to Tangier over twenty years ago as medical practitioner. He later founded the prosperous firm of Ellis and Co. During the war he was chief of the Press Office and received the C.M.G. in recognition of his work. He is an able and hard-headed business man, with a finger in many Tangier pies and extremely well informed on Tangier subjects, but his views are apt to be coloured by his own personal interest. He is correspondent of the London *Times*. One of the most forceful personalities in Tangier.

9. Girardière, Edmond
French Assistant Administrator of Native Affairs. An intelligent and able man, with considerable administrative experience, who appears to have the interests of the natives genuinely at heart.

10. González Gordon, Pedro (Marqués de Torresoto)
Spaniard, born about 1886. Head of the sherry firm of González Byass. Very wealthy. Completely pro-British, speaks English perfectly, related to the Gilbey family. Monarchist and anti-Falange.

11. Humbert, René
French member of the Legislative Assembly, and Director of the Port Concession.

12. Jecquier, Daniel
Retired French banker, very rich. M. Jecquier has always been friendly to this consulate-general. He owns a great deal of land, and has frequently been approached by various persons for sale of land for such purposes as aerodromes and wireless stations.

13. Katzaros, John
Of Greek origin, has been naturalised as a British subject. The Katzaros family have been connected with the British Legation and subsequently con-

suiate-general for the past sixty years, and were generally thought in Tangier to be British. They talk English at home. John Katzaros is secretary to the Legislative Assembly.

14. Legrand, Lieut.-Colonel V. J.
Chief of Police. The colonel is a nominee of the Belgian Government and was accompanied by nine other Belgian police officials. He gets on well with the French, who have made much of him. He does not appear to be as alive as his subordinates are to an undercurrent of French hostility to the Belgians. He is very much influenced by his French second-in-command, Commandant Artous.

15. Melenotte, Raoul
Chief engineer of the Public Works of the Zone. A pleasant type of French official.

16. Merry, Diaz Manuel
Spanish judge of the Mixed Court, born about 1886. An able lawyer, but given to deciding cases by the light of reason rather than the rule of law, so that many of his decisions are reversed on appeal. Corruptible.

17. Parladé, Jaime
Spaniard, born about 1900. Educated at Stonyhurst. Originally an officer in the artillery and later in the International Gendarmerie of the International Zone. Remained in Tangier until just before end of civil war, in which he participated on the side of General Franco. Is now managing director of the local telephone company, which he runs efficiently; also engages in miscellaneous comercial transactions of a speculative kind. Affects to be pro-British, but was friendly to Axis during the war and is not to be trusted.

18. Rafferty, Michael Henry
Born 1877, British judge on the Mixed Court. Judge Rafferty is getting too old for his job, and while nobody questions his integrity, he is generally regarded as being easily influenced and having little will of his own.

19. Rodière, Yves
French procureur of the Mixed Court, born in 1885. Member of French judicial service. Able and very hard-working. Has spent most of his career in Morocco. Reputed to be corruptible.

20. Tovar, Duke of, and Marqués de Gauna
Son of a former Spanish Ambassador in Rome. Lived in Tangier unmolested throughout the war in spite of his Royalist sympathies. As a grandee of Spain he has recently taken a public stand as the principal Royalist in Tangier. His royalism is probably a matter of ideology and loyalty, and, prodigiously fat as he is, he does not give the impression of a man of action. Very rich.

21. Vallet, Jean
Born 23rd May, 1885. Appointed by Vichy as French judge at Tribunal Mixte. In 1940 was head of local " Action Française en Égypte " and was at that time described as one of the most dangerous Frenchmen in Egypt. Stated on all sides to be anti-British and to have been 100 per cent. collaborationist.

22. Vredenburch, Jonkheer
Succeeded Admiral Magalhaes de Correa as Administrator of the Zone in August 1948. Formerly a member of the Netherlands Diplomatic Service, M. van Vredenburch was Directeur-Politique at The Hague before being sent on a mission to Java with the rank of Cabinet Minister early in 1948. On appointment to Tangier he resigned from the Dutch service. M. van Vredenburch is a complete contrast to his predecessor. Young—in the forties—forceful and direct, of quick intelligence and speaking excellent English and French, he at once made his presence felt in the Administration. He is now perhaps beginning to realise that direct action is not always successful in Tangier. Mme. van Vredenburch, who is his second wife, is smart and good-looking. They have three children.

23. Wauters, Alfred
Born 1912. Belgian judge of the Mixed Court appointed to replace M. de Foy. Worked with Belgian Government in United Kingdom from 1943. Was Permier Substitut du Procureur du Roi up to date of his appointment to Tangier.

JEWS

1. Abensur, Aaron
British subject, born about 1895. Owns, with his brother Moses (Maurice), the local banking-house of Moses Pariente, established in 1844, with which this consulate-general and the former British Legation have banked for at least sixty years. Father naturalised in 1896 by special Act of Parliament on account of the family's long services to the Crown. Of undoubted loyalty, he is always ready to help His Majesty's Consulate-General and is a very sound and reliable banker.

2. Alster, Jakob
Banker. Polish born, 30th December, 1901. Has very bad reputation but is generally regarded as most able business man in Tangier.

3. Bendrao Ruah, Isaac
Born Tangier, 26th December, 1900. Said to be richest man in Tangier, very friendly with the more influential section of the Spanish colony and claims to be a close personal friend of General Varela.

4. Bengualid, Semtob
Moroccan subject, born about 1880. Local head of the firm of Isaac and Joseph Cohen, the principal importers of British goods. Slightly in difficulties of late. Hard worker and highly respected. Jewish member of the Legislative Assembly of the International Zone.

5. Hassan, Joseph
Portuguese subject, born about 1880. Very rich. Head of the Hassan family, who own the Salvador Hassan Bank. Bank's Tetuan agency acted as Franco's bankers in the civil war, other banks in the Spanish Zone being either foreign and non-interventionist or else controlled by Republican Madrid.

6. Salama Benatar, Isaac and Samuel
Have made a vast fortune during the war. Financial activities not above suspicion, but have never been black-listed.

MOSLEMS

1. Si Ahmed ben Hajj Majammad Tazi
The Mendoub's son and his First Khalifa. Born in 1901. Fought on Abdelkrim's side in the Riff campaign, 1926. Appointed Governor of Tangier prison, 1928. Later held post of Second Khalifa to his father until both were expelled in 1941. While in Rabat was Directeur de Ravitaillement. Returned with Mendoub on 11th October, 1945. More or less ran the Mendoub until latter's death in February 1948, since when he has been acting in his place. Si Ahmed Tazi is intelligent, speaks good French and plays the French game assiduously. He has inherited a large fortune from his father and is almost certainly not above grinding the faces of the faithful. The Sultan has so far steadily refused to appoint him Mendoub but, as he has been doing the work for years, he would probably be the best choice for the post in spite of his typically conservative Moorish outlook.

2. Si Mohammed ben Abderrahman Saidi
The Mendoub's Second Khalifa. Born about 1896. Native of Tangier. Son-in-law of Si Kaddor ben Ghabrit, the Sultan's " chef du protocole " in Paris. Has held minor posts at Mogador, Meknes and Rabat. Appointed to present position on 11th October, 1945. Modest, unassuming and friendly.

3. Si Mohammed Guennoun
Mendoub's Third Khalifa, born about 1908 in Fez but lived mostly in Tangier. Was Cadi's Khalifa before 1939, later notary. Has better reputation than Nos. 1 and 2. Is brother of No. 13.

4. Si Mohammed ben Driss ben Rahmoun
Kadi of Tangier. Born 1876 but does not look his age. Native of Fez. Formerly scribe at court of the Sultan Moulay Abdelaziz. Present at Paris and Madrid conferences on Tangier. Held post of Kadi at Mogador. Appointed to Tangier on re-establishment of International régime. Has bad reputation, reported to insist on bribes before signing documents or giving judgment. Professes to be a friend of England.

5. Si Mohammed Erkaina
Administrator of Pious Foundations. Born about 1912. Reputed to be pro-British.

6. Moulay Ahmed el-Amrani
Mohtassib of Tangier, appointed 11th October, 1945. Born in 1871. Native of Fez. After learning trade of carpenter, became successively scribe to Mohtassib, Khalifa to Mohtassib and finally Mohtassib.

7. Si Abdessalam Shebaa
Born in 1881. Member of good old Tangier family. Holds post of " Bou Mouarit " (Curateur des Successions vacantes) and is also member of the Legislative Assembly. At the request of Mendoub remained in Tangier during Spanish occupation to help with supply questions. Dependable and friendly.

8. Moulay Ahmed ben Hajj Abdessalam el-Wazzani
Born in 1876. Son of well-known Shereef of Wazzan. Was Pasha of Wazzan, now retired.

9. Sidi Ahmed ben Sidi Mohammed ben Siddiq el-Ghomari
Born in 1901. Chief of the Derkaoua Fraternity, with some 400 followers in Tangier and others in surrounding tribes. Studied at Al-Azhar University, Cairo, and is anxious to return to Egypt. Clever and untrustworthy, ready to work for highest bidder. A source of worry and fear to the French authorities. Organiser of demonstration involving procession of some 3,000 natives through streets in 1947.

10. Si Abdelkrim Erkiouak
Born in 1896. Notary and senior scribe in International Administration. Worked steadily for our cause during the war.

11. Si Abderrahman Menebhi
Son of the late Sir Mehdi-el-Menebhi, G.C.M.G., and brother-in-law of the Pasha of Marrakesh, El Glaoui. Enjoys a certain prestige as the son of his father, but not very reliable or of strong character. Is under French influence.

12. Sidi Mohammed al-Mekki Nasiri
Born about 1907, formerly resident in Tetuan. Founder and leader of Moroccan Unity Party, editor of party's newspapers (*Al-Wahdah al-Maghribia*, suppressed by Spanish authorities, Tetuan; *La Voix du Maroc*, in 1947 by Committee of Control, Tangier). Founder and director of Moulay al-Mahdi Institute, Tetuan, with branch in Tangier. Studied in Cairo 1927–31 and revisited Egypt 1937–38 (where he still has good contacts) to found Beit-al-Maghrib. Probably more moderate Nationalist than some of his followers; professes admiration for Great Britain and United States, inclined to be wordy; an intellectual rather than a leader.

13. Si Abdullah Guennoun
Born about 1909. Taught in Franco-Arab school, left in order to start a " free " (*i.e.*, not officially controlled) school 1937. New school built by public subscription and opened 1947. French and Spaniards have both sought his allegiance, but he is reputed to be non-political. In any case, the French are much less suspicious of his activities than they are of Nasiri's.

14. Ahmed Belghiti Tlemsani
Born about 1912. Father a French subject (from Tlemçen). Editor of Arabic newspaper *Mourrakouch*, said to be financed by French. Newspaper suspended by Committee of Control for six months in 1947 on account of articles denouncing Spanish methods in Spanish Zone.

15. Si Ahmed Erkaina
Born about 1907. Owns large bakery. Probably most intelligent and outspoken of six Moorish members of Legislative Assembly.

Obituary

Fesser, Adolfo.
Hajj Mahammad ben Abdelkrim Tazi.